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Abstract: Authentication is one of the essential security services in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
for ensuring secure data sessions. Sensor node authentication ensures the confidentiality and validity
of data collected by the sensor node, whereas user authentication guarantees that only legitimate
users can access the sensor data. In a mobile WSN, sensor and user nodes move across the network
and exchange data with multiple nodes, thus experiencing the authentication process multiple times.
The integration of WSNs with Internet of Things (IoT) brings forth a new kind of WSN architecture
along with stricter security requirements; for instance, a sensor node or a user node may need to
establish multiple concurrent secure data sessions. With concurrent data sessions, the frequency
of the re-authentication process increases in proportion to the number of concurrent connections.
Moreover, to establish multiple data sessions, it is essential that a protocol participant have the
capability of running multiple instances of the protocol run, which makes the security issue even
more challenging. The currently available authentication protocols were designed for the autonomous
WSN and do not account for the above requirements. Hence, ensuring a lightweight and efficient
authentication protocol has become more crucial. In this paper, we present a novel, lightweight and
efficient key exchange and authentication protocol suite called the Secure Mobile Sensor Network
(SMSN) Authentication Protocol. In the SMSN a mobile node goes through an initial authentication
procedure and receives a re-authentication ticket from the base station. Later a mobile node can
use this re-authentication ticket when establishing multiple data exchange sessions and/or when
moving across the network. This scheme reduces the communication and computational complexity
of the authentication process. We proved the strength of our protocol with rigorous security analysis
(including formal analysis using the BAN-logic) and simulated the SMSN and previously proposed
schemes in an automated protocol verifier tool. Finally, we compared the computational complexity
and communication cost against well-known authentication protocols.
Keywords: authentication; sensor networks; network security; key distribution; privacy; BAN logic
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of a vast number of distributed sensor nodes.
Each sensor node is an autonomous system that monitors and collects data from the surrounding
environment. In wireless sensor networks, the sensor nodes have limited computational power
and communication capabilities; hence, most of the conventional cryptographic mechanisms and
security protocols are not suitable for resource limited WSNs. For instance, very efficient public
key algorithms, such as ECC [1], need a fraction of a second to execute the encryption/decryption
procedures, while a symmetric key algorithm, such as RC5 [2], needs only a fraction of a millisecond
to perform encryption and decryption procedures [3–5]. In a sensor network where devices have
limited resources, the asymmetric cryptographic functions must be used wisely; for instance, use
the asymmetric cryptography when an authentication responder already verified the initiator and
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wants to share secret information. If the responder does not authenticate the initiator and the initiator
uses the asymmetric cryptography to exchange a message, the network becomes vulnerable to DOS
attacks [5,6]. The WSN related contraints mentioned above are known to the research community.
The currently available authentication protocols are designed for the autonomous WSN from the
perspective of the above constraints. Moreover, in the near future in the realization of the vision of
emerging technologies such as IoT, D2D, smart home and smart cities, WSNs will provide an invaluable
service by acting as a virtual layer between the physical world and the computational devices [7–9].
However, integration of WSNs with IoT will bring forth a new kind of WSN architecture and stricter
security requirements; for instance, in a smart hospital (as shown in Figure 1b) a sensor node or a user
node may require the establishment of multiple concurrent secure data sessions. To establish a secure
data session, authentication is the first step. In a dynamic, mobile WSN environment, where sensors
and user nodes can establish multiple concurrent connections, a node moving across the network
undergoes the authentication check multiple times and the frequency of the re-authentication process
increases in proportion to the number of concurrent connections. Moreover, to establish multiple data
sessions, it is essential that a protocol participant has the capability of running multiple instances
of the protocol run, which makes the security issue even more challenging. Thus, it is essential to
adopt a secure yet lightweight authentication procedure that especially reduces the computational
time and communication at the mobile sensor node. The currently available authentication protocols
were designed for the autonomous WSN and do not account for these new emerging challenges.
This work presents a novel authentication protocol suite called the Secure Mobile Sensor Network
(SMSN) Authentication Protocol. The SMSN protocol suite consists of six protocols: three protocols
deal with mobile sensor node authentication with sink nodes and the other three deal with user node
activation and authentication with the base station, sink nodes, and sensor nodes. In the SMSN, mobile
sensors and user nodes can join and leave the system dynamically and can establish secure multiple
concurrent connections. After the initial authentication, a mobile sensor or a user node can move
across the network and get re-authenticated by a simple ticket-based re-authentication protocol; for
instance, a user node can establish concurrent connections with multiple sink and sensor nodes using
a re-authentication ticket issued during the initial-authentication protocol run. To establish multiple
connections, a node is allowed to run multiple instances of the protocol; consequently, we introduce
extra design requirements to meet the goals of a secure authentication protocol. In this paper, we also
present an efficient and lightweight key generation and distribution mechanism. In the key generation
protocol, a commitment key is generated by a group of participants (the base station and sink nodes)
using an irreversible function; the key agreement and key retrieval protocol are the same as that
employed in [10]. The commitment key is further applied to drive multiple time-based encryption
keys, for example, the ticket encryption key and session key between the sink and user/sensor are
derived from the commitment key. The time dimension in the protocol increases the security of
the protocol; although the group members do not need to be tightly or loosely time synchronized.
To determine the security of the protocol in this study, we performed a rigorous security analysis
and also simulated the SMSN and previously proposed schemes [11–16] in an automated security
protocol analysis tool called Scyther [17,18], which is a powerful state-of-art tool that finds attacks for
defined protocol properties. We observed that our authentication protocol is secure, and it achieves all
the objectives of an authentication protocol, which are defined as protocol claims in Section 4.3; for
a detailed description of protocol claims, please refer to [19,20]. We also compared the efficiency of
the SMSN in terms of computational time and communication complexities as discussed in [11–16].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work. In Section 3,
we present a brief system overview and problem statement. Section 4 describes the proposed scheme
with a detailed discussion. In Section 5, we assess the strength of our scheme against the known
attacks. Section 6 presents an efficiency analysis that compares a few interesting schemes with our
scheme. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in Section 7.
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2. Related Work
Typically, WSNs are comprised of distributed devices with limited resources. Most of the
conventional cryptographic mechanisms and security protocols are computationally expensive and are
not suitable for resource-limited WSNs. In the recent past, the research community proposed several
authentication protocols [11–16,21–27] that provide security in a WSN environment. Since the sensor
nodes have low computational time, storage and communication capabilities, it is essential to design an
efficient and lightweight yet secure authentication mechanism. From the point of view of computational
and communication complexity, the authentication procedure in a wireless network with a mobile
sensor and user node is an expensive task. A node moving across the network undergoes multiple
authentication checks. Thus, it is essential to adopt a secure yet lightweight authentication procedure
that especially reduces the computational and communication resources at the mobile sensor node.
In [28] the authors discussed various anomaly detection techniques for flat and hierarchical wireless
sensor networks, but detection techniques are not sufficient for several security threats. However, for a
secure system together with detection methods, prevention techniques such as authentication is also
vital; various authentication protocols for WSNs were proposed in [11–16,21–27]. In 2006, Wong [21]
proposed a user authentication scheme for a dynamic WSN. The scheme is password based and
employs lightweight cryptographic hash and XOR operations. Later on, Tesng et al. [11] and Das [22]
identified that the Wong [21] scheme had various weaknesses and was vulnerable to replay attacks and
forgery attacks, and the user password is known to the sensor node and can be revealed by any sensor
node. Tesng et al. [11] proposed an improved version to mitigate the weaknesses that posed security
threats in the Wong [21] scheme. The scheme of Tesng et al. [11] is also a password-based scheme, but
the password is not revealed to the sensor nodes, and they also introduced a new phase of password
change. Nevertheless, the scheme of Tesng et al. [11] is weak against replay attacks, impersonation
attacks and forgery attacks [29]. Moreover, the scheme does not provide a mutual authentication
between the gateway (GW) and sensor node (SN). In 2009, Das [22] proposed a two-factor user
authentication scheme in which legitimate users can register and log in to the remotely deployed
sensor nodes to access the collected data. From the point of view of computational and communication
complexity, the scheme is reasonably efficient. The author claimed the scheme was secure against
various kinds of attacks. However, later work [30–32] suggested that the scheme was vulnerable to
different types of attacks, including impersonation, password guessing, insider, and parallel session
attacks. Moreover, it did not provide the mutual authentication between the GW and sensor nodes. In
2010, Yoo et al. [12] proposed a user authentication scheme for WSNs and analyzed the protocol using
BAN logic [33]. However, the BAN logic provided a foundation for the formal analysis of security
protocols, but in the case of authentication, various attacks could slip through the BAN logic [34,35].
The scheme of Yoo et al. provided mutual authentication between the GW and the user and established
a session key between the GW and SN. The authors claimed that the scheme was safe against insider
attacks, impersonation attacks, and parallel session attacks. However, in [27] the authors provided
a detailed analysis of the scheme of Yoo et al. and proved that the scheme is susceptible to various
attacks, including insider attacks, impersonation attacks, parallel session attacks, password guessing
attacks, fake registration attacks, and DOS attacks. Kumar et al. [36] proposed an authentication
protocol for WSNs and claimed it could satisfy all the security requirements of the WSN; however,
He et al. [37] proved that the scheme was weak against insider attacks and offline password guessing
attacks and could not provide user anonymity. Kumar proposed another enhanced scheme in [13]
and once again claimed that the scheme could withstand most of the known attacks and provide
user privacy. However, with the Scyther implementation, given in Section 4.6, we found that the
improved scheme presented in [13] was still vulnerable to insider attacks, parallel session attacks,
and impersonation attacks. Farash et al. [15] proposed a key agreement and authentication protocol
for WSNs in the Internet of Things (IoT) environment. The scheme was well designed and provided
security against several well-known attacks. The author proved the strength of the protocol with
BAN logic and further confirmed the theoretical analysis results by implementing the protocol in
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the AVISPA [38] tool. However, similar to other schemes discussed above, Farash et al. [15] did not
consider the requirement of concurrent sessions, which are more likely to occur in an IoT environment.
Moreover, our implementation of the scheme of Farash et al. [15] in Scyther revealed that the GW was
vulnerable against insider attacks and impersonation attacks. The scheme was insecure in the presence
of an intruder as discussed in Section 4.6, which assumed that the initial knowledge set of intruders
included the identities of all sensor and user nodes. With known identities, an intruder can impersonate
the user node and deceive the GW to falsify the authentication properties. Similarly, the Scyther
implementation of the recently published work of Y. Lu et al. [16] and Quan et al. [14] revealed that
at least two protocol participants falsified the authentication properties. The majority of the schemes
discussed above provided the GW and user authentication schemes; however, Farash et al. [15] and
Y. Lu et al. [16] also considered the GW and sensor node authentication, while Farash et al. [15] also
allowed the user to access the data from sensor nodes directly. Li et al. [39] proposed an authentication
protocol for sensor and user nodes. However, the proposed scheme requires time synchronization
among protocol participants, and also employs the asymmetric elliptic curve cryptography, which is
not a good design choice for resource limited WSN applications. For instance, very efficient public
key algorithms, such as ECC [1], need a fraction of a second to execute the encryption/decryption
procedures, while a symmetric key algorithm , such as RC5 [2], needs only a fraction of a millisecond
to perform encryption and decryption procedures [3–5]. Unlike all the schemes discussed above,
our proposed scheme, the SMSN authentication protocol suite, allows the sensor and user nodes to
establish multiple concurrent connections with different sensor and sink nodes, which makes our
scheme suitable for deploying it in the future to support IoT and related emerging technologies.
Moreover, the SMSN authentication protocol suite provides several kinds of mutual authentications;
for instance, after the initial authentication, a sensor or the user node receives an authentication ticket
issued by the base station. The ticket can be further used for sensor-sink, user-sink, and user-sensor
mutual authentication. The SMSN protocol suite consists of six protocols: three protocols deal with
mobile sensor node authentication with sink nodes, and the other three deal with user node activation
and authentication with the base station, sink nodes, and sensor nodes.
3. System Overview and Problem Statement
A typical WSN consists of the base station (BS), sink node (S), sensor node (N) and user node
(Ui). We assume that the BS knows the public keys of the sink (S), sensor (N) and user (U) nodes.
3.1. System Architecture
An IoT smart service provider deploys the WSN with various base stations connected to the
internet through a service center (SC). In the WSN, each BSj forms a group Gj consisting of neighbor
base stations and associated sink nodes. All group members share a symmetric group key K jG, which
is controlled by the group master BSj using a group key agreement protocol such as discussed in [40].
Furthermore, the base station can access and download the profile of the mobile Sensor (N) and User
(U) nodes. Each profile has a unique secret number nis ; besides being know to the base station, this
secret number is also known to the corresponding Sensor (N) and User (U) nodes. The profile and
unique secret number nis of all legitimate users and sensor nodes are accessible to the base station
through the service center.
An example of the overall system architecture is depicted in Figure 1a. BS1 creates a group
consisting of neighbor BS0 and BS2 and associated sinks (S1, S3). BS1 generates a group key K1G and
shares it among all group members. The profiles and the associated unique secret number of U1, N1,
and N2 are accessible to BS0, BS1, and BS2 via the service center. An application scenario is given in
Figure 1b. In a smart hospital, the health status of a hospitalized patient is continuously monitored
by the several sensors mounted over the patient’s body. For the secrecy of patients’ health data it is
essential that only authorized users be able to access the data. When a patient takes a walk in the
hospital, all the mounted sensors continuously transfer the different sets of data to the nearby sinks.
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With the SMSN, the sensors do not need to follow the full authentication procedure for each data
session; instead, the session continues by sharing a simple re-authentication ticket that provides the
sensor-sink mutual authentication. Similarly, when an authorized doctor or nursing staff visits patients,
he or she can access the sensor data in real time via a user device by establishing multiple data sessions
with various sinks and sensor nodes. While he moves from patient to patient, his device does not need
to follow a complete authentication procedure for each data session; rather, a simple re-authentication
ticket can be used for re-authentication. From outside of the hospital, an authorized person can log
into the hospital system and access the necessary data from sink and base stations by using the same
re-authentication ticket.
Figure 1. (a) An example scenario of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). Sensor node N1is initially
authenticated by BS1; while moving across the network it is re-authenticated by the re-authentication
ticket. At the final destination N1 shares data with multiple sink nodes while user node U1 collects data
from sensor node N2 and sink node S3. (b) An application scenario of Secure Mobile Sensor Network
(SMSN) in a smart hospital. Authorised doctors and nursing staff can access the data from sensor
nodes using a user device.
3.2. Problem Statement
As described earlier, in IoT and other related emerging technologies, a mobile sensor or user
node may need to exchange data with multiple nodes and so will experience the authentication
process multiple times. With multiple concurrent connections, the authentication process becomes
even more expensive while a node moves across the network. As shown in Figure 1a, sensor node N1 is
communicating with sink nodes S5 and S6 simultaneously. Likewise, user node U1 is communicating
with sink node S3 and sensor node N2 simultaneously. In such an application scenario, when a sensor
or the user node moves across the network the frequency of the re-authentication process increases in
proportion to the number of concurrent connections. Moreover, to establish multiple data sessions,
it is essential that a protocol participant run multiple instances of the protocol run, which makes the
security issue even more challenging. To perform multiple parallel re-authentications, it is evident
that the protocol participants run multiple instances of the protocol. With the multiple protocol runs,
the assurance of security of the protocol becomes more challenging. Therefore, for seamless services,
lightweight yet secure re-authentication is vital.
According to our knowledge, we are the first to propose an authentication protocol for concurrent
secure connections. To perform multiple parallel re-authentications, the protocol participants must
run multiple instances of the protocol. With multiple protocol runs, the assurance of security of the
protocol becomes more challenging. We developed our scheme, the SMSN, considering the following
constraints: (1) the communication channels are insecure; (2) an intruder with the capabilities as
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described in Section-5-C is present in the network to launch various attacks; (3) due to the requirements
for a WSN deployed in an IoT environment, the protocol participants are allowed to run multiple
instances of the protocol; and (4) user and sensor nodes can dynamiclly leave and join the network
and can move across the network.
3.3. Notations
• BSj = The jth base station
• Sj = The jth sink
• Ni = The ith sensor node
• Ui = The ith user node
• A ∼ B = A is associated with B such that B is controlling authority
• Gj = Group of all associated entities of jth BS
• Goj = Group of all non-associated entities of jth BS who knows the K
j
G
• K ji = The time-based key generated at ith interval by BSj
• K jG = A group key generated by BSj
• KiS = N → S session key generated at ith interval
• KiPS = N → S private session key
• KiTS = Temporary session key
• EiB(m) = Encryption of ’m’, using key KiB
• Vi = The index value for interval i
• Tk = The kth Ticket
• Z(A) = An intruder Z mimicking the entity A
• ni = ith nonce in a message exchange
4. Proposed Scheme
The SMSN protocol suite consists of two protocol suites, the Keying Protocol suite and an
Authentication Protocol suite. The Keying Protocol suit further comprises a key agreement protocol, a
key retrieval protocol (which is the same as the one employed in [10]), and a key management protocol;
likewise, the authentication protocol further comprises six protocols, three dealing with mobile sensor
node authentication with sink nodes and the other three dealing with user node activation and
authentication with a base station, sink nodes, and sensor nodes in different scenarios. In subsequent
sections, the SMSN protocol suite is described in detail.
4.1. Keying Protocol Suite
In key generation protocol a ’commitment key’ is generated by group participants (the base station
and sink nodes) using an irreversible function similar to that as used in [10,41]. The ’commitment key’
is further used to drive multiple time-based keys; for instance, the ticket encryption key and session
key between the sink and user/sensor are derived from the ’commitment key’.
4.1.1. Key Agreement Protocol
The key generation and distribution mechanism is shown in Figure 2 and consists of the
following steps: (1) After every time interval Td, BSj broadcasts the key generation information
(KeyMSG) to all members of Gj. (2) Using the key generation information (KEYMSG), all members
generate a Commitment Key Generator ζ j0 = H(Td, N
j
0). (3) All members of Gj can now
generate a “ Chain of Key Generators” of length L by using an irreversible one-way function:
H(ζ j0) = ζ
j
1, H(ζ
j
1) = ζ
j
2 . . . H(ζ
j
l−1) = ζ
j
l ; i.e., H(ζ
j
k)
i = ζ
j
k+i. (4) Each generator (ζ) in the chain is
used by function gat specific intervals to derive indexes and a ticket encryption key pair. For instance,
at interval k for any sensor or user node i, which is requesting the BSj to join the network, the function
g(ζ jk) = H(ζ
j
k, H(n
i
0))||H(k) generates ticket encryption key K jk and index Vk value. In function g the
value ni0 is a secret nonce sent by node i in a network join message. (5) Furthermore, BSj issues a
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session key based upon the ticket encryption key K jk and secret nonce n
i
0, i.e., K
i
S = H(K
j
k, n
i
S) where
niS is the secret random number assigned to legitimate sensor and user node.
Figure 2. Time-based keys generation and admission with reference to time passage.
All the symmetric keys generated in the above discussion have a size of 256 bits (32 bytes); hence,
in the subsequent section of authentication protocols any symmetric encryption supporting the 256-bit
key can be used, e.g., RC5/6 [2]; Rijndael [42], Twofish [43], MARS [44], and Blowfish [45].
4.1.2. The Key Retrieval Protocol
After initial authentication, BSj issues a ticket to the requesting node. The ticket consists of two
parts: (1) The first half consists of the sensor node identity (id) Ni, the session key Kis , secret nonce
ni0, and the profile. This part of the ticket is encrypted with time-based key K
i
l . (2) The second half
consists of sensor node id Ni, the hash of group id H(Gj) , and the required information to retrieve the
time-based key Kil . The hash of group id H(G
j) is an optional field used only if sink nodes can join
multiple base stations; in that case, it is used to identify the group and to select the correct keychain.
In the key retrieval, information depends on the selected mode and can be the scrambled index value
V, index vector VHash, or index value i; the modes of a ticket are explained below.
Mode-01:
In mode-01, the ticket retrieval information comprises the index value (Vi), requesting node id
Nk, and the hash of the user’s private key. The ticket verifier searches the appended index value (Vi)
within its generated vector (V). A search hit at the ith place means that key K ji can decrypt the ticket.
Tk = E
j
i (Ni||Kis||ni0||Pro f ||E
j
G(Ni||Vi||H(Gj)) (Ticket formate for mode-01)
Mode-02:
If the group members are in a fully secure environment, the SMSN employs a simple ticket
retrieval strategy. Instead of using a scrambled index value V in mode-02 in the ticket retrieval,
the information contains the interval value. In this mode, the ticket verifier does not need to run a
search algorithm.
Tk = E
j
i (Ni||Kis||ni0||Pro f ||E
j
G(Ni||i||H(Gj)) (Ticket formate for mode-02)
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Mode-03:
In mode-03, the ticket retrieval information is the same as in mode-01 except it includes a hash
vector of size log2 |V| − 2. These hash values are carefully chosen nodes of the binary hash tree, which
is generated such that the leaf nodes are indexed vector (V) values as shown in Figure 3.
Tk = E
j
i (Ni||Kis||ni0||Pro f ||E
j
G(Ni||VHash||H(Gj)) (Ticket formate for mode-03)
Figure 3. Example of Binary Hash Tree generated with index vector V = v1, v2, v3, v4.
Search Algorithm:
• Start from the root and move down
• Ignore appended values and follow the path of the reconstructed node
• Continue until level log2 |V| − 1 is reached
• At level log2 |V|, select the appended value that is the index value.
Mode-03 is suitable if the Chain of the Key Generator is very long. The tree “root node” is included
in Tk (optionally), which ensures that a trusted group member generated Tk.
4.1.3. Key Management Protocol for the Sink Node
At the start of the Chain of the Key Generator, the sink node reissues the ticket and session keys
to associated nodes. To spread out the workload in the time dimension the sink node keeps the history
of the previous key chain and issues a ticket/session key based on the moving window algorithm.
Let us consider a chain with a length of 3; Figure 4 shows how the sink node spread the workload
throughout the chain by adopting the moving window approach.
Figure 4. Managing the chain of the key generator in the sink.
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Step 1: The sink node discards the previous chain C0 and generates the commitment key generator
Gj0 for the next chain C2. Step 2: The sink node reissues the ticket and session key to all sensor nodes
authenticated at interval 1. Step 3: The sink node reissues the ticket and session key to all sensor nodes
authenticated at interval 2. Step 4: The sink node reissues the ticket and session key to all sensor
nodes authenticated at interval 3 and discards the previous chain and generates the commitment key
generator Gj0 for the next chain.
4.2. Authentication Protocol Suite
When a sensor node joins the system, it goes through the Sensor Activation and Authentication
Protocol (SAAP). After SAAP, Ni can establish multiple concurrent secure connections with sink
nodes using the authentication ticket (Tk); similarly, Ni uses the Tk for re-authentication while
moving across the network. Likewise, when a user node Ui joins the system, it goes through User
Activation and Authentication Protocol (UAAP); subsequently, Ui can use the authentication ticket
(Tk) for authorization to collect data from multiple sink and sensor nodes. In a concurrent run of
multiple instances of the protocol, the message authentication plays a critical part in preventing the
replay attack and to achieve the objectives of the authentication protocol as defined in [19,20]. In an
SMSN message, authentication is accomplished by a secure exchange of a randomly generated nonce
challenge. Moreover, in all the protocols discussed below, if the protocol initiator (user or sensor node)
does not hear the response to an authentication/switch request, the protocol initiator resends the
authentication/switch request including a new nonce and ’resend’ flag. This step helps detect the
impersonation, replay, and parallel session attack.
4.2.1. Sensor Activation and Authentication Protocol (SAAP)
Sink node Sj periodically broadcasts a Hello message (BSj||Sj). If a node Ni wants to join the
WSN, upon hearing the Hellomessage, Ni generates an encryption key KiTS = H(BSj ⊕ niS), encrypts
the joining message with the generated key, and continues as follows:
Figure 5. Message exchange for Sensor Activation and Authentication Protocol (SAAP) .
M1 As shown in Figure 5, Ni sends a JOIN message to sink Sj enclosing n0 and encrypted with the
generated encryption key KiTS.
M2 Upon receiving the request from Ni, the Sj forwards the request in conjunction with its identity
and challenge n2 to base station BSj.
M3 BSj retrieves the profile from the database, and if Ni isa legitimate sensor node, BSj generates
the key KiTS = H(BSj ⊕ niS), and sends u0 = EiTS (n0 + 1||n1||Tk||TR||Kis) to Sj in M3. M3 also
includes ticket Tk, n1 (a challenge for Ni ), and n2 (challenge response for the sink node), all
encrypted with K jG. The sink node Sj verifies the challenge n2, stores n1 and retrieves the profile
and Kis from the ticket.
M4 Sj forwards the u0 to Ni. After a challenge (n0 + 1) verification, Ni accepts Tk and may start
sending data to Sj.
M5 Sj sends the challenge response (n1 + 1) to BSj for the confirmation of a successful protocol run.
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M6 After challenge (n1 + 1) confirmation, Sj starts accepting sensor data; otherwise, it marks Tk as
an invalid ticket.
In the SAAP, a secure exchange of n0 ensures the message authentication between the sensor
node and the base station, n2 between the sink node and base station, and n1 between the base station
and the sink node, while message authentication between the sensor and sink nodes is established by
session key encryption and n1. If Ni is already registered with BSj, in M1 n0 can be replaced with the
hash of the password value.
4.2.2. Sensor Re-Authentication Protocol -1 (SRP1)
If sensor node Ni wants to establish multiple secure connections with sinks Sj ∈ Gi or when a Ni
moves from Sk → Sj such that {Sk, Sj} ∈ Gi, the Re-Authentication Protocol -1 continues as follows:
Figure 6. Message exchange for Sensor Re-Authentication Protocol-1 (SRP1).
M1 As shown in Figure 6, Ni sends SwitchReq = EiS(Ni||H(ni0))||Tk to Sj. The sink Sj decrypts the
ticket, retrieves Kis, calculates the hash of ni0, and makes a comparison with H(n
i
0) received in the
switch message. If the value H(ni0) does not match, the Sj will ignore the request and otherwise
proceed as follows.
M2 Sj sends a challenge response along with the new challenge encrypted with session key Kis.
M3 Ni sends the challenge response n1. After challenge confirmation, Sj starts accepting data;
otherwise, it marks Tk as an invalid ticket.
In the above procedure, secure exchange of ni0 ensures the message authentication between the
sensor node and the sink node. With this feature, a sensor node can establish multiple secure sessions
with various sink nodes as shown in Figure 1.
4.2.3. Sensor Re-Authentication Protocol -2 (SRP2)
If sensor node Ni wants to establish another secure connection with sinks Sj ∈ Gok or when a Ni
moves from Sk → Sj such that Sj ∈ Gok , the re-authentication procedure proceeds as follows:
Figure 7. Message exchange for Sensor Re-Authentication Protocol-2 (SRP2).
M1 As shown in Figure 7, Ni sends SwitchReq = EiS(Ni||H(ni0))||Tk to Sj. The sink Sj decrypts the
second half of Tk and verifies the identities of Ni and ticket granting base station.
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M2 After identities verification the sink Sj forwards the request in conjunction with a challenge n2 to
base station BSj.
M3 BSj retrieves the profile from Tk, and if Ni isa legitimate sensor node, the BSj generates the key
KiTS = H(BSj ⊕ niS), and sends unew0 = EiTS(H(ni0)||n1||Tk||TR||Kis) to Sj in M3. M3 also includes
ticket Tk, n1 (a challenge for Ni), and n2 (challenge response for the sink node), all encrypted
with K jG. The sink node Sj verifies the challenge n2, stores n1 and retrieves the profile and K
i
s
from the ticket.
M4 Sj forwards unew0 to Ni. After challenge (n0 + 1) verification Ni accepts Tk and start sending data
to Sj.
M5 Sj sends the challenge response (n1 + 1) to BSj ; it confirms a successful protocol run.
M6 After challenge (n1 + 1) confirmation Sj start accepting data; otherwise, it marks Tk as an
invalid ticket.
In the SRP2, a secure exchange of n0 ensures the message authentication between the sensor node
and the base station, n2 between the sink node and base station, and n1 between the base station and
the sink node, while message authentication between the sensor and sink nodes is established by
session key encryption and n1. If Ni wants to share data in a secret mode, both Nj and Sj generate a
private session key K jsp = H(Kis, ni0, n1). With this feature, a sensor node can establish multiple secure
sessions with various sink nodes as shown in Figure 1.
4.2.4. User Activation and Authentication Protocol (UAAP)
In some scenarios a user may desire to access data from the sensor network, for example, in IoT
applications such as smart homes and smart buildings, a smartphone user may want to get sensor
node data. In SMSN authentication protocol suites, an authenticated user (holding a valid ticket) can
access data directly from sensor nodes and/or can collect from the sink node. The ticket structure
for Ui is the same as the ticket structure discussed above for Ni where the sensor node identity and
profile are replaced with the user node identity and profile. The user profile information includes the
permissible accessibility information. In the User Activation and Authentication Protocol (UAAP) a
user can acquire a ticket from BSj in two different ways. If the user is not in the communication range
of BSj it routes the joining message via the nearest sink node Sj; the protocol proceeds exactly as in the
SAAP. However, if the user is in the communication range of BSj, the user Ui generates an encryption
key KiTS = H(BSj ⊕ niS), encrypts the joining message with the generated key, and proceeds as follows:
Figure 8. Message exchange for User Activation and Authentication Protocol (UAAP).
M1 As shown in Figure 8, Ui sends a JOIN message enclosingn0 and the user identity to base
station BSj.
M2 BSj retrieves profile from the database, and if Ui is a legitimate user, the BSj generates
authentication ticket, and send along with, n1 ( a challenge for Ui), and n0 (challenge response),
all encrypted with KiTS = H(BSj ⊕ niS). The ticket structure is same except the secret nonce n1
enclosed inside ticket is generated by BSj.
M3 The user node Ui verifies the challenge n0, stores Tk and n1. Ui sends the challenge response
(n1 + 1) to BSj; it confirms a successful protocol run . After receiving a challenge response
(n1 + 1) the BSj updates the status of Ui from idle to active user.
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In User Activation and Authentication Protocol, secure exchange of n0 ensures the message
authentication between user node and base station and n1between the base station and user node.
4.2.5. User-Sink Authentication Protocol (USiAP)
After acquiring the authentication ticket, if user Uk wants to retrieve data from sink nodes Sj, it
sends a JOIN request in conjunction with a ticket to Sj and then follows the same procedure as discussed
in Sensor Re-Authentication Protocols 1 and 2; except after ticket verification, Sj can piggyback data
with the rest of the messages. Using the authentication ticket, user Uk can also establish multiple
concurrent connections with various sink nodes.
4.2.6. User- Sensor Authentication Protocol (USeAP)
After acquiring the authentication ticket, if user Uk wants to access data directly from sensor nodes
Ni, it sends a JOIN request in conjunction with a ticket to Ni and the procedure proceeds as follows:
Figure 9. Message exchange for User-Sensor Authentication Protocol (USeAP).
M1 As shown in Figure 9, Uk sends a JOIN message in conjunction with ticket and challenge n0
encrypted with its ticket centered session key.
M2 Upon receiving the request from Uk the Ni forward the ticket and encrypted challenge n1 to sink
node sj.
M3 Sink decrypts the ticket and retrieves U′ks profile and session key K
k
S, and if Ui is a legitimate
user node, Sj sends KkS and challenge response (n1 + 1) to Ni.
M4 After challenge verification, Ni generates a private session key Kkps = H(Kks , n0) and sends a
challenge response encrypted with the private session key. Uk also generates the private session
key and verifies the challenge response.
In User-Sensor Authentication Protocol suite, secure exchange of n0 ensures the message
authentication between users and sensor node, while the secure exchange of n1 ensures the message
authentication between sensor node and sink node.
5. Security Analysis
This section presents the comprehensive security analysis of the SMSN protocol, including an
informal security analysis and discussion of a formal security analysis using BAN logic [32], and
finally presents the Scyther [17,18] implementation result of the SMSN and previously proposed
schemes [11–16].
5.1. Informal Analysis and Discussion
To verify the strength of the SMSN protocol against known attacks we introduce an intruder in the
network with capabilities as follows: It has an initial information set that contains the IDs of all users,
sensor nodes, sink nodes and base stations. It can intercept and record message exchanges between
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participating entities. It can redirect, spoof, and replay the messages. The subsequent sections show
that the intruders, with all the above-mentioned capabilities, fail to launch a successful replay, parallel
session, man-in-middle , impersonation, and several other attacks against the SMSN protocol suite.
5.1.1. Replay, Multiplicity, Parallel and Man in Middle Attacks Against the SMSN
We introduce an intruder, as discussed above, in the network and launch replay, multiplicity,
parallel session, and man-in-middle attacks against the SMSN for three different scenarios, as shown in
Figures 10, 11 and 12. The intruder Zimpersonates a protocol participant, intercepts the messages, and
replays them to deceive other protocol participants. Replay, multiplicity, parallel, and man-in-middle
attacks against the SAAP for three different scenarios are given below.
Scenario 1:
For the given scenario in Figure 10, let us suppose a sensor node Ni sends a request for
authentication to sink Sj ∼ BSj . During the protocol run an intruder Z(Ni) intercepts the messages and
replays them to another sink Si ∼ BSj; the attack proceeds as follows: The intruder Z(Ni) intercepts
M1 and replays it to Si. The attack is detected immediately when BSj receives two M2 messages
enclosing the same M1. BSj sends M3 to both sinks comprising the ’Alert’ flag and a different n1 nonce
challenge. Z(Ni) intercepts M6 and replays it to Si; note that the intercepted message M6 comprises
a different n1 which is the only valid response for a sink Sj. Upon receiving the wrong challenge
response, the sink Si identifies the intruder node. The SAAP not only detects the replay attack but also
identifies the intruder.
Figure 10. The intruder Z impersonates the protocol initiator N1 (can be a sensor or user node). Intruder
Z(N1) intercepts the messages between N1 and sink S1 and replays them to sink S2. Both sinks are
associated with base station 1 and share the same keychain.
Scenario 2:
For the given scenario in Figure 11, let us suppose a sensor node Ni sends a request for
authentication to sink Sj ∼ BSj . During the protocol run an intruder Z(Ni) intercepts the messages and
replays them to another sink Si ∼ BSi; the attack proceeds as follows: The intruder Z(Ni) intercepts
M1 and replays it to Si. Unlike in scenario 1, neither base station BSj and BSi can detect the attack at
this stage and replies with a normal M3 to associated sink nodes Si and Sj, respectively. However, both
M3 messages comprise a different n1 nonce challenge. Z(Ni) intercepts the M6 and replays it to Si;
note that the intercepted message M6 contains a different n1 which is the only valid response for the
sink Sj. Upon receiving the wrong challenge response, the sink Si identifies the intruder.
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Figure 11. The intruder Z impersonates the protocol initiator N1 (can be a sensor or user node).
Intruder Z(N1) intercepts the messages between N1 and sink S2 and replays them to sink S3. Sink S2
is associated with base station 1 , and Sink S3 is associated with base station 2.
Scenario 3:
For the given scenario in Figure 12, let us suppose two intruders impersonate the sink Sj ∼ BSj
and sensor node Ni; the intruder Z(Ni) is within the region of Si ∼ BSi , and intruder Z(Sj) is outside
somewhere close to node Ni. Furthermore, both intruders can communicate through a private link
with zero delay. During the protocol run intruder Z(Sj) intercepts the messages sent by sensor node
Ni and replays it to BSj; also Z(Sj) shares all the intercepted messages with fellow intruder Z(Ni) via
a private secure channel; the attack proceeds as follows: The intruder Z(Sj) intercepts M1 sent by Ni
and shares the intercepted message with Z(Ni). The intruder Z(Ni) sends the intercepted message
to Si ∼ BSi; the protocol proceeds normally and upon receiving M4 the intruder Z(Ni) sends the
message M4 to Z(Sj). The intruder Z(Sj) sends M4 to sensor node Ni; upon receiving M6 the intruder
Z(Sj) shares the message M6 with Z(Ni). The intruder Z(Ni) sends M6 to Si ∼ BSi and the attack is
completed. The attack is only successful if the replay of M6 is delivered to Sj within a time interval of
Td/L where L is the length of the keychain. Moreover, in practice when the private link between fellow
intruders adds a communication delay, Ni can detect the attack by comparing the TR (registration time
sent in u0) with the local time.
Figure 12. Two intruders impersonate the sink node S1 BS1 and sensor node N1; the intruder Z(N1) is
within the region of S1 BS1, and intruder Z(S1) is outside somewhere close to node N1. Both intruders
can communicate with zero communication delay via a private link.
As the outcome of the above attack, Ni considers that the authentication process was completed
successfully. However, the intruders cannot get any useful information during a protocol run: Z(Sj)
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does not know the session key delivered to Ni, so Z(Sj) cannot further communicate with Ni. Due to
the unavailability of a data link, Ni uses the ticket to run SRP1/2. However, a problem exists on
the other side: sink Si and base station BSi consider that they authenticated a legitimate sensor Ni
successfully; from their point of view, the sensor Ni is within the region of BSi but in reality, Ni is
in the region of BSj. Similarly, in the case of SRP1, SRP2, UAAP, USiAP, and USeAP the intruder Z
fails to launch successful attacks for scenarios 1 and 2; however, the intruder Zcompletes the attack in
scenario 3.
In a nutshell, replay, multiplicity, parallel and man-in-middle attacks against the SMSN protocol
are not successful. Even though in scenario 3 the intruders completed the attack, they could not cause
a serious security issue because after the completion of the protocol run, the intruder could not get
useful information such as the session key, ticket, or partial session key. Furthermore, the attack can be
avoided by introducing a timestamp in each message exchange. For illustration, the intruders need to
wait for a significantly longer time to replay M4 and M6, and this significant delay can be detected
with the time stamp, which reveals the existence of the intruder in the network.
5.1.2. Black Hole Attack
In a black hole attack [46–48] the intruder impersonates a node and blocks or drops the messages
upon receiving them. In the SMSN, the sensor and user nodes can connect to multiple sink nodes
simultaneously; hence, failure of data exchange on one route does not block the data delivery towards
the base station. Moreover, the black hole attack is detectable in our scheme because the SMSN
ensures binding by employing an exchange of secret nonce between Ni ↔ Sj, Ni ↔ BSj, and Bj ↔ B.
Consecutive failures of exchange of challenge detects the black hole attack. Once the black hole is
detected, the sensor node can send data via another sink node.
5.1.3. Wormhole Attack
In a wormhole attack [49,50], the intruder captures the messages in one location and tunnel
to another location to a fellow intruder who replays the tunneled messages in another location area.
The attack discussed in scenario 3 can be regarded as a wormhole attack. From the point of view of
replay, multiplicity, parallel and man-in-middle attacks, the attack in scenario 3 did not achieve its
objectives, but from the point of view of the wormhole attack, the attack is successful. The solution
for the problem is similar to the one we discussed earlier: the attack can be avoided by introducing a
timestamp in each message exchange.
5.1.4. Analytical Attacks
In an analytic attack [31,51], the intruder intercepts the messages and using cryptanalysis tries to
recover a cryptographic key. With the inclusion of a time-based key, our scheme inherits the freshness
property, which defies the capability of the intruder to launch analytical attacks, as it has a max time of
Td to acquire the time-based key, which makes it difficult to launch analytical attacks.
5.1.5. Topological Centered Attacks
In [52,53] the authors presented an authentication protocol for a sensor network in which the sink
issues a re-authentication ticket that includes a list of neighbor sink nodes. This information can lead to
topological centered attacks [27,28] such as identity replication attacks. In our scheme, the topological
information is entirely obscured from the sink and sensor nodes.
5.2. Formal Analysis Using BAN Logic
The BAN logic [32] is a widely used formal method for the formal analysis of security protocols.
To prove the security of the SMSN protocol suite it is sufficient to demonstrate the security of the SAAP
and UAAP protocols; the rest of the protocols are extensions of the SAAP and UAAP and use the ticket
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and session key established in the SAAP and UAAP protocols run. Hence, proof of SAAP and UAAP
protocols concludes the security of the SMSN protocol suite.
The three basic objects of BAN logic are principals, formula/statements, and encryption keys.
The principals, the protocol participants, are represented by symbols P and Q. The formula/statements
are symbolized by X and Y and represents the content of the message exchanged. The encryption keys
are symbolized by K. The logical notations of BAN-logic used for our analysis is given below:
• P |= X : P believes X, or P would be enabled to believe X; in conclusion, P can take X as true.
• P ≺ X : P sees/receives X. P initially has or received a message X and P can see the contents of
the message and is capable of repeating X.
• P| ∼ X : P once said X. P has sent a message including the statement X. However, the freshness
of message is unknown.
• P⇒ X : P controls X and should be trusted for formula/statement X.
• #(X) : X is fresh; it says, X never sent by any principal before.
• P K←→ Q : P and Q shares a key K to communicate in a secure way and K is only known to P, Q
and a trusted principal.
• (X)K : The statement X is encrypted by key K.
• {X}Y : It stand for X combined with Y. Y is anticipated to be secret and its implicit or explicit
presence proves the identity of a principal who completes the {X}Y.
Some primary BAN-logic postulates used in the analysis of the SMSN are given below:
• Message meaning rules: P|=P
K←→Q,P≺(X)K
P|=Q|∼X ,
P|=P Y←→Q,P≺XY
P|=Q|∼X
• Nonce verification rule: P|=#(X),P|=Q|∼XP|=Q|=X
• Jurisdiction rule: P|=Q⇒X,P|=Q|=XP|=X
• Freshness rule: P|=#(X)P|=(X,Y)
• Believe rule: P|=Q|=(X,Y)P|=X,P|=Y
• Session key rule: P|=Q#(X),P|=Q|=X
P|=P K←→Q
5.2.1. BAN Logic Analysis of SAAP
The SAAP protocol should achieve the following goals:
G1 Ni |= (Ni
KiS←→ Sj)
G2 Ni |= Sj |= (Ni
KiS←→ Sj)
G3 Sj |= (Ni
KiS←→ Sj)
G4 Sj |= Ni |= (Ni(Ni
KiS←→ Sj)
Protocol Idealization:
I1 Ni
ViaSj←−→ BSj : {n0, (Ni
niS←→ BSj)}H(XS)
I2 Sj → BSj : {n2, IDSj}
I3 BSj → Sj : {(n1, n2, (Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj), ni0)Kil=H(ζ jl ,H(ni0)), Vi)KiG , {n0, n1, (Ni
KiS←→
Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj), ni0)Kil=H(ζ jl ,H(ni0)), TR, Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj), Ni
niS←→ BSj}H(XS)}
I4 Sj
ViaBSj←−−→ Ni : {n0, n1, (Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj), ni0)Kil=H(ζ jl ,ni0), TR, Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→
Sj), Ni
niS←→ BSj}H(XS)
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I5 Sj → Ni : (IDSj)Kis
I6 Ni → Sj : (n1)KiS
Initial State Assumptions:
A1 BSj |= #(n0)
A2 BSj |= #(n2)
A3 Sj |= #(n1)
A4 Ni |= #(n1)
A5 Ni |= (Ni KTS=H(XS)←−−−−−→ BSj)
A6 BSj |= (Ni KTS=H(XS)←−−−−−→ BSj)
A7 Sj |= (Sj
K jG←→ BSj)
A8 BSj |= (Sj
K jG←→ BSj)
A9 BSj |= Ni |= (Ni KTS=H(XS)←−−−−−→ BSj)
A10 Ni |= BSj |= (Ni KTS=H(XS)←−−−−−→ BSj)
A11 BSj |= Sj |= (Sj
K jG←→ BSj)
A12 Sj |= BSj |= (Sj
K jG←→ BSj)
Let us analyze the protocol to show that Ni and Sj share a session key:
From I1, we have
BSj ≺ {n0, (Ni
niS←→ BSj)}H(XS) (1)
The (1), A6 and message meaning rule infers that
Sj |= Ni| ∼ {n0, (Ni
niS←→ BSj)} (2)
The A1 and freshness conjuncatenation comprehends that
BSj |= #{n0, (Ni
niS←→ BSj)} (3)
The (2), (3) and nonce verification rule deduces that
BSj |= {Ni |= niS, n0, (Ni
niS←→ BSj)} (4)
The (4) and believe rule infers that
BSj |= Ni |= (Ni
niS←→ BSj) (5)
From A2, (5) and jurisdiction rule, it concludes
BSj |= (Ni
niS←→ BSj) (6)
This belief confirms that BSj has received a message from a legitimateNi.
From I2, we have
BSj ≺ n2 (7)
The (7) and message meaning it infers that
BSj |= Sj| ∼ n2 (8)
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The A2, A1, (3) and freshness conjuncatenation comprehends that
BSj |= #{n0, n2, (Ni
niS←→ BSj)} (9)
According to nonce freshness, this proves that BSj confirms that Ni is recently alive and running
the protocol with BSj.
From I3, we have
Sj ≺ (n1, n2, (Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj), ni0)Kil=H(ζ jl ,H(ni0)), Vi)KiG (10)
The A7 and (10) deduce that
Sj |= BSj| ∼ {n1, ni0, Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj), Vi} (11)
The A3, (11) and freshness conjuncatenation comprehends that
Sj |= #{n1, ni0, Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj), Vi} (12)
The (11), (12) and nonce verification rule infers that
Sj |= BSj |= {n1, ni0, Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj), Vi} (13)
The (13) and believe rule comprehends that
Sj |= BSj |= (Ni
KiS←→ Sj) (14)
The logic belief proves that Sj is confident and believes that KiS is issued by BSj; moreover, the
freshness of the key also suggests that BSjis alive and running the protocol with Sj and Ni.
The (13), (14) and jurisdiction rule concludes that (15 Goal-3)
Sj |= (Ni
KiS←→ Sj) (15)
From I4, we have
Ni ≺ {n1, , TR, Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj), Ni
niS←→ BSj}H(XS) (16)
The (16), A5 and message meaning rule comprehends that
Ni |= BSj| ∼ {n1, , TR, Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj)} (17)
The (17), A4 and freshness conjuncatenation rule infers that
Ni |= #{n1, , TR, Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj)} (18)
The (17), (18) and nonce verification rule deduce that
Ni |= BSj |= {n1, , TR, Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ni
KiS←→ Sj)} (19)
The (19) and believe rule infers that
Ni |= BSj |= {Ni
KiS←→ Sj, } (20)
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The (19), (20) and jurisdiction rule concludes that (21 Goal-1)
Ni |= {Ni
KiS←→ Sj, } (21)
From I5, we have
Ni ≺ IDSj (22)
The (15), (21), (22) and meaning rule comprehends that (23 Goal-4)
Sj |= Ni |= {Ni
KiS←→ Sj, } (23)
From I6,we have
Sj ≺ n1 (24)
The (15), (21), (23) and nonce verification rule deduce that (25 Goal-2)
Ni |= Sj |= {Ni
KiS←→ Sj, } (25)
1. BAN Logic Analysis of UAAPP:
The UAAP protocol should achieve the following goals:
G1 Ui |= (Ui
KiS←→ Sj)
G2 BSj |= Ui |= (Ui
KiS←→ Sj)
G3 Ui |= BSj |= (Ui
KiS←→ Sj)
Idealization of UAAP:
I1 Ui → BSj : {n0, (Ui
niS←→ BSj)}H(XS)
I2 BSj → Ui : {n0, n1, (Ui
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ui
KiS←→ Sj), ni0)Kil=H(ζ jl ,H(ni0)), (Vi)KiG , TR, Ni
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ui
KiS←→
Sj), Ui
niS←→ BSj}H(XS)
I3 Ui → BSj : (n1)KiS
Initial State Assumptions of UAAP:
A1 BSj |= #(n0)
A2 Ui |= #(n1)
A3 Ni |= (Ui KTS=H(XS)←−−−−−→ BSj)
A4 BSj |= (Ui KTS=H(XS)←−−−−−→ BSj)
A5 Sj |= Ni |= (Ni KTS=H(XS)←−−−−−→ BSj)
A6 Ni |= BSj |= (Ni KTS=H(XS)←−−−−−→ BSj)
Let us analyze the protocol to show that UAAPachieves the mentioned goals:
From I1, we have
BSj ≺ {n0, (Ui
niS←→ BSj)}H(XS) (26)
The (26), A4 and message meaning rule infers that
BSj |= Ui| ∼ {n0, (Ui
niS←→ BSj)} (27)
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The A1 and freshness conjuncatenation comprehend that
BSj |= #{n0, (Ui
niS←→ BSj)} (28)
The (27), (28) and nonce verification rule deduces that
BSj |= {Ui |= niS, n0, (Ui
niS←→ BSj)} (29)
The (29) and believe rule infers that
BSj |= Ui |= (Ui
niS←→ BSj) (30)
From A1, (30) and jurisdiction rule, it concludes
BSj |= (Ui
niS←→ BSj) (31)
This belief confirms that BSj has received a message from a legitimateNi.
From M2, we have
Ui ≺ {n1, , TR, Ui
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ui
KiS←→ Sj), Ui
niS←→ BSj}H(XS) (32)
The (32), A3 and message meaning rule comprehends that
Ui |= BSj| ∼ {n1, , TR, Ui
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ui
KiS←→ Sj)} (33)
The (33), A2 and freshness conjuncatenation rule infers that
Ui |= #{n1, , TR, Ui
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ui
KiS←→ Sj)} (34)
The (33), (34) and nonce verification rule deduce that
Ui |= BSj |= {n1, , TR, Ui
KiS←→ Sj, #(Ui
KiS←→ Sj)} (35)
The (35) and believe rule infers that (36 Goal-2)
Ui |= BSj |= {Ui
KiS←→ Sj, } (36)
The (35), (36) and jurisdiction rule concludes that (37 Goal-1)
Ui |= {Ui
KiS←→ Sj} (37)
From I3, we have
BSj ≺ n1 (38)
The (36), (37), (38) and meaning rule comprehends that (39 Goal-3)
BSj |= Ui |= {Ui
KiS←→ Sj, } (39)
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Table 1. Scyther tool parameter settings.
Parameter Settings
Number of Runs 1∼3
Matching Type Find all Type Flaws
Search pruning Find All Attacks
Number of pattern per claim 10
Table 2. Comparison of authentication properties.
Claims H. Tseng[11]
Yoo et al.
[12]
Kumar
et al. [13]
Quan
et al. [14]
Farash
et al. [15]
Y. Lu
et al. [16] SMSN
Ui Ni GW Ui Ni GW Ui Ni GW Ui Ni GW Ui Ni GW Ui Ni GW Ui Ni GW
Aliveness N N N N N N Y N N Y N N Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y
Weak Agreement N N N N N N Y N N Y N N Y Y N N N Y O Y Y
Non-injective Agreement N N N N N N O N N Y N N Y Y N N N Y O Y Y
Non-injective Synch. N N N N N N O N N Y N N Y Y N N N Y O Y Y
N = Authentication claim is not fulfilled; Y = Authentication claim is fulfilled; O = Authentication claim is fulfilled but falsified for protocol instances >3.
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5.3. Verifying Protocol Using Scyther Tool
The previous section proved that according to the BAN logic the SMSN is a secure authentication
scheme. The BAN logic provided a foundation for the formal analysis of security protocols, but few
attacks can slip through the BAN logic [32]. For further proof of the strength of the SMSN protocol
suite, we implemented the SMSN and [11–16] schemes in the automated security protocol analysis
tool, Scyther [17,18]. Our proposed scheme provides a strong defense against known attacks in the
presence of an intruder (Z) which is capable of regulating the communication channel, redirecting,
spoofing, replaying or blocking the messages. It has initially known information, e.g., IDs and public
keys of all users, and any intercepted message is additional information to the current information set
(S), i.e., S ∪ {m}. It can generate a fresh message from known data, e.g., S ` m, and can run multiple
instances of the protocol. The Scyther tool verifies the protocol claims and checks the possibility of
attacks against the protocol. The claims are the event that describes the design and security properties
of the authentication protocol. We consider four claims as defined below; for a detailed description of
protocol claims, please refer to [19,20].
In Scyther the protocol is modeled as an exchange of messages among different
participating ’roles’; for instance, in sensor node authentication, the sensor node is in the role of
initiator, the sink is in the role of responder and the base station is in the role of a server. The Scyther
tool integrates the authentication properties into the protocol specification as a claim event. We tested
our protocol [11–16] employing claims, as mentioned earlier, with the parameter settings given in
Table 1.
The results are shown in Table 2. It is clear that in the presence of an intruder (as defined above),
our protocol qualifies all the protocol claims and no attacks were found. Hence, for a large number
of systems and scenarios, our protocol guarantees safety against a large number of known attacks,
such as impersonating, man-in-middle and replay attacks, etc. In contrast, [11–16] are susceptible to
several attacks and failed to fulfill the authentication claims. Moreover, in protocol schemes [11–16],
there is a lack of sender-receiver binding verification, and an intruder can exploit this situation to
impersonate a sensor node and run multiple instances of the protocol to launch multiplicity and
man-in-middle attacks.
6. Performance Analysis
Although the SMSN authentication protocol suite covers authentication procedures for both
sensor and user nodes, for the sake of simplicity, we compare the efficiency of the SMSN with user
authentication protocols. We compared the efficiency of the SMSN user authentication protocols
considering computational cost, message complexity and time synchronization requirements to that
of [11–16]. Unlike in [11–16], the SMSN allows the user to be authenticated with both sensor and
sink nodes.
The total computation cost is estimated as the sum of the total number of
E = encryptions/decryptions, M = Multiplications, H = hash, X = XOR, and T = Time Synchronization
operations. Moreover, we assume that cryptographic hash and symmetric encryption/decryption
operations have computational complexity similar to O(m), where m is the size of the message. All the
schemes in [11–16] considered that the registration process took place via a secure channel. We assume
that in all schemes the user node Ui and Gateway GWj exchange the registration information using a
secure encrypted channel. Furthermore, one encrypted unicast message requires two Eoperations, one
for encryption and one for decryption. Similarly, a broadcast message to Nrecipient adds the (N + 1)E
operations in the total computational complexity.
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Table 3. Performance comparison of SMSN with well-known user authentication protocols.
Schemes Phase Comp. Complexity Comm. Complexity Comm. Cost in Bytes Time Synch.
H. Tseng[11] Registration (4 + N)E + 1H 2UC + 1BC (2N + 3)int -Login-Authentication 6H + 1X 4UC 2CK + 7int 1T
Yoo et al. [12] Registration (4 + N)E + 5H + 2X 2UC + 1BC (5 + N)CK + 1int -Login-Authentication 19H + 2X 6UC 5CK + 8int 1T
Kumar et al. [13] Registration 4H + 3X 2UC 5CK + 3int -Login-Authentication 14H + 2X 3UC 6CK + 11int 2T
Quan et al. [14] Registration 12E + 9H + 1X + 7M 4UC 4CK + 9int + 4 f 4TLogin-Authentication 18H + 2X 4UC 8CK + 16int 4T
Farash et al. [15] Registration 4E + 6H + 2X 2UC 4CK + 1int 2TLogin-Authentication 30H + 16X 4UC 17CK + 5int 4T
Y. Lu et al. [16] Registration 4E + 10H + 2X 2UC 4CK + 1int -Login-Authentication 8E + 17H + 15X 4UC 4CK + 18int 3T
SMSN (User-Sink) Registration 8E + 5H 3UC 3CK + 10int -Login-Authentication 8E + 2H 3UC 3CK + 8int Optional
SMSN (User-Sensor) Registration 8E + 5H 3UC 3CK + 10int -Login-Authentication 9E + 2H 4UC 5CK + 12int Optional
Computational Complexity: E = encryptions/decryptions, Ex = modular exponentiations, M = multiplications, H = hash operation, X = XOR operation , N = Total number of nodes ,
T = Time Synchronization operation; Communication Complexity and Cost: BC = Broadcast Message, UC = Unicast Message, CK = 32 bytes (Represents Size of Cryptographic KeyHash
and Signature), Int = 4 bytes ( Represents Size of nonce, Node Ids and Integers), f = 8 bytes (Represents Size of the floating point real number.
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From Table 3 we can see that computational complexity of SMSN authentication protocols
in the registration phase is slightly more expensive compared to Kumar et al. [13] and
Farash et al. [15]; however; in the authentication phase, the SMSN authentication protocols completely
outperform Kumar et al. [13] and Farash et al. [15]. H. Tseng [11] and Yoo et al. [12] are the most
computationally expensive schemes during the registration phase, but in the authentication phase,
H. Tseng [11] is the most efficient scheme followed by the SMSN. However, regarding sensor node
computational efficiency, in our scheme, the overall workload of a sensor node is very low. Moreover,
unlike the [12–14,21] schemes, the SMSN does not require time synchronization between the Gateway
and user node.
The communication complexity is calculated as the sum of the total unicast and broadcast message
exchange. Figure 13 shows the overall communication complexity in a WSN when the number of
sensor nodes is fixed in the network, and the number of new users’ requests is constantly increasing.
The message complexity of [11] and [12] increases multiplicatively by increasing the number of
nodes; conversely, it grows slowly in the case of the SMSN, [13], [14], and [15]. Figure 14 shows the
overall communication complexity for various network sizes with the same number of user requests.
This metric is only useful for a WSN with mobile sensor and user nodes. The message complexity of
[11,12] increases rapidly with an increase in the number of new users’ requests; conversely, it remains
constant with the SMSN, [13], [14], and [15]. This suggests that the schemes proposed in [11,12] are
not suitable for highly dynamic mobile WSNs where the frequency of leaving and joining the network
is high.
Figure 13. The total number of message exchanged between constant number of sensor nodes with
different number of new users’ requests.
However, a more interesting comparison in terms of communication efficiency is the comparison
based on the amount of data exchanged during the protocol run. The numerical results are taken for a
dynamic and mobile sensor network consisting of 100 nodes. The probability that a new user may join
the network and an existing user may leave the system defines how frequently the users join and leave
the network. The average communication cost per user is calculated for the dynamic probability of
0.05 to 0.5, and the results are shown in Figure 15.
SMSN user-sink authentication outperforms all other schemes from less dynamic to highly
dynamic networks. However, in a less dynamic network with a dynamic probability of less than 0.05,
the SMSN user-sensor authentication is slightly more expensive than the scheme of H. Tseng [11].
Even though in a less dynamic system the SMSN user-sensor authentication is slightly more expensive
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than [11], the performance gap decreases, and for highly mobile and dynamic networks, SMSN
performs better than the scheme of H. Tseng [11].
Figure 14. The total number of message exchanged for constant number of new users request in
different network size.
Figure 15. The amount of data exchanged for less to highly dynamic sensor network.
7. Conclusions
Due to the recent growth in WSN technologies, we have observed an enormous paradigm shift in
sensor network applications. The authentication and security goals of a sensor network have become
more crucial and challenging. Most of the user and sensor node authentication schemes for WSNs have
been developed without taking into account the requirements of integrating WSNs with emerging
technologies such as IoT. We developed an SMSN scheme considering the requirements of mobile and
dynamic WSN applications as discussed in Section-III. We noted that the user authentication schemes
designed for sensor networks [11–16] do not meet the authentication properties; for example, the
execution of these schemes in the Scyther tool revealed that the participating entities failed to achieve
wider objectives (defined as protocol claims in Section 5-C) of the authentication protocol. Finally,
we compared the efficiency of the SMSN user authentication protocols with the schemes in [11–16].
We observed that concerning the computational cost, our scheme is slightly more expensive compared
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to [13,15] during the registration phase but the SMSN totally outperforms both in the authentication
phase. Regarding message complexity our proposed scheme totally outperforms [11–15]; however, the
performance of the scheme of Y. Lu et al. [16] is close to the SMSN. Finally, unlike the schemes in [11–16],
the SMSN does not require time synchronization between the Gateway (base station) and the user node.
The main focus of this work was to discuss and provide solutions for the emerging challenge that has
emerged from the integration of the WSN in IoT applications. To prove the usability of the proposed
scheme, we made a comprehensive security and performance analysis and simulated the proposed idea
in an automated protocol verifier tool, the Scyther. However, for future work, it will be interesting to
investigate the usability of the SMSN by implementing it on an application specific testbed. Moreover,
in the near future it will be possible to incorporate the basic Internet functionality in the sensor node.
We believe it will further enhance the application scenarios for the SMSN; for instance a user device will
be able to collect real-time sensor data remotely via the Internet. Moreover, we are further investigating
the usage of SMSN for the promising future internet architecture, known as Name-Data-Networking
(NDN), which is extensively studied in the literature [54–59]. In NDN the contents verification is
achieved by the use of asymmetric cryptography. We argue that in future especially in IoT application
scenarios the devices will be resource constraint devices; for instance, the sensor network is going to
be the part of IoT. For resource constraint devices the asymmetric cryptography is computationally
expensive. We believe that SMSN protocol suit with some modifications can be a suitable candidate
for NDN internet architecture.
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